



Lots (though Fewer) of (and More Hosted) Copies Keep Stuff Safe


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
Internet Archive Web and Data Services Partner
Meeting
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understand preservation threats

- long-term data integrity is hard
- need architecture informed by actual leading threats to data
- don't underestimate:
 - people making mistakes
 - attacks on information
 - organizational failure





mitigate preservation threats

- lots of copies is necessary but not sufficient
- central points of failure can undermine all copies at once
- multi-organizational preservation storage provides:
 - resilience against organizational failure
 - compartmentalization against operator error
 - decentralization against attacks
 - diversity in technical infrastructure





LOCKSS Networks

- a dozen networks
- hundreds of institutions
- all types of content
- preservation via diversity of:
 - technologies
 - institutions
 - networks





















Confederation



network model evolution

- in original, Global LOCKSS Network, all nodes stored copies
- communities running private LOCKSS networks are consolidating nodes
 - only a subset run nodes
 - whole community is served, participates in governance, provides funding
- under (co-)hosted service model, Stanford + trusted partners may serve as anchor storage hosts





IPLC Preservation Network pilot

- 5x nodes: Harvard, IA (x2), Princeton, Stanford
- all IPLC Archive-It collections ingested + under active preservation
- ingest + audit/repair
 take place
 automatically via
 LOCKSS software

